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Classical learning in fields including rhetoric, poetry, literary criticism and biology 
blossomed in the late-fifth century schools in Gaza.1 Aeneas of Gaza (fl. 480 AD) 
ventured into philosophy, possibly after philosophical studies under Hierocles in 
Alexandria.2 In his Theophrastus, a philosophical dialogue about the pre-existence of 
the soul and the eternity of the world, Aeneas attacked philosophy as a threat to 
Christian teaching.3 Yet he was also prepared to employ its methods of argument and 
pick from it anything that might be useful. In this paper, I investigate the extent of 
Aeneas’ knowledge of contemporary Neoplatonism by analyzing his arguments about 
the soul, particularly surrounding the central problem of transmigration of souls 
(μετενσωμάτωσις, μετεμψύχωσις, μεταγγισμὸς ψυχῶν). I argue that Aeneas had 
accurate knowledge of contemporary and historical Platonism, but that his specific 
engagement with Neoplatonists is limited by his larger intra-Christian aims. Among 
these, I suggest that emerging forms of Origenism in the Gazan monasteries provide 
one interpretive frame for Aeneas’ dialogue.  
 Zacharias Scholasticus, (whose Ammonius is deeply indebted to Aeneas) has 
Aeneas explain that:  
Often, if I came across some problem in a certain place concerning a word from Plato, Aristotle or 
Plotinus, and I could not find a solution to it among those who teach and interpret their opinions, I 
would ask [Abba Isaiah] to make their intention and purpose clear to me as to what they wanted to 
say, and he would illumine and reveal the meaning and purpose of the passage, and he would not 
only redress its error but also reinforce the truth of Christian teaching.  (Life of Isaiah 8)4
While this is clearly an apologetic statement in the hagiographic tradition, where the 
saint demonstrates that Christian ‘philosophy’ out-shines the pagan versions, it is also 
evidence that Neoplatonic philosophy was of interest to sophists connected to late-
antique Gaza.5  
 Yet the extent of Aeneas’ knowledge of contemporary Neoplatonism has been 
controversial. Hadot argued that Aeneas’ dialogue is a ‘point by point’ refutation of 
Hierocles’ de Providentia.6 Aujoulat has rightly cast serious doubt on this claim, but 
the degree of Aeneas’ engagement with other Neoplatonists remains an open 
question.7 Where a Christian writer fails to engage with the detail of a philosopher’s 
argument, he may be said to be ignorant or merely more interested in other questions. 
                                                 
1  For these schools, see Downey (1958); Seitz (1892). A detailed reconsideration of these schools is 
a desideratum. For those associated with the schools, see Kaster (1988) and Szbat (2007) 212ff. 
2  Praise for Hierocles in his dialogue is usually taken as an autobiographical hint (Theophrastus 2.9-
10) (References to the Theophrastus throughout will be to page and line number). Aeneas’ fellow 
Gazan, Zacharias Scholasticus, also wrote a philosophical-theological dialogue. There is controversy 
about whether Aeneas’ contemporary in the Gazan schools, Procopius, directly attacked Proclus. For 
pro and contra, see Westerink (1942) and Stiglmayer (1899). 
3  For Aeneas’ Theophrastus, see the edition by Minniti-Colonna (1958). 
4  Translations throughout are my own. In this case, the translation is from the Latin rendering of the 
transmitted Syriac Life by Brooks (1907). 
5  For the topos of the strength of Christian ‘philosophy’ in hagiography, see e.g. Athanasius, Life of 
Antony, 72-80. For Zacharias’ philosophical sources, see Minniti-Colonna (1973) 46-49, 51-55 (her 
index locorum should be used with particular care). 
6  See Hadot (1978) 20.  
7  Aujoulat (1987) sees general acquaintance with Hierocles but concludes that detailed engagement 
with Hierocles’ ideas, at least in the de Prov. cannot be demonstrated (81). In Aujoulat’s view, closer 
knowledge of Proclus is more easily demonstrated (79). 
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I seek to show that, on this topic, Aeneas’ knowledge extends from Plato to 
contemporary Neoplatonism, suggesting that the latter solution is more applicable to 
Aeneas.8 Hence I claim that Aeneas’ arguments about the soul position him between 
contemporary Neoplatonism and emerging Christian doctrinal controversies. Ideas on 
the soul and resurrection associated with followers of Origen may may be read as 
providing an intra-Christian context for Aeneas’ arguments. I propose that Aeneas’ 
attacks on Neoplatonic transmigration may simultaneously be read as rebuttals of 
Origenist ideas about the resurrection of souls to different levels of being.9 But if 
Aeneas is implicitly engaging with Origenism, a means of transmission to Gaza of 
such ideas needs to be identified. Hence I go on to suggest that members of the Gazan 
monasteries helped to mediate Origenism to Aeneas.10 My paper therefore helps to 
identify how and where Origenist ideas circulated between the fourth century 
persecutions of Origenists in Alexandria and the sixth-century condemnation of 
Origenism under Justinian (553).11  
 As the later Neoplatonic commentator Olympiodorus argued, belief in the 
transmigration of the soul arises from two premises: 1) the immortality of the soul and 
2) the eternity of the world (in Phaed. 10.1, Westerink 136-7). If souls are immortal 
and the cosmos is eternal, then at any instance the number of ensouled beings will be 
infinite, contradicting the Aristotelian principle that an actual infinity is impossible 
(Arist., Phys. 3.5, 204a20-30).12 Aristotle was taken to have denied transmigration by 
rejecting the principle that the soul is immortal (Olympiodorus in Phaed. 10.1, 
Westerink 138-9; Arist. De an. I, 3, 407b22). But since Neoplatonists followed Plato 
in believing that the soul is immortal and the world is eternal, they felt themselves 
committed to some form of reincarnation. Aristotle’s rejection of the immortality of 
the soul also made this a live question for Neoplatonists, who tried to make a case for 
the soul’s immortality against Aristotle’s view.13
 In Aeneas’ dialogue, the pagan philosopher Theophrastus begins from a collection 
of earlier philosophical opinions which is extensively dependent on the initial section 
of Plotinus’ Ennead on the topic (IV.8.1) (Theophrastus 5.10ff). Plotinus sets out 
possible answers to questions about how souls which have contemplated truth and 
beauty in the intelligible realm could enter the realm of discursive reasoning, and how 
such a soul could enter a body. In the Theophrastus, the questions are slightly 
different. The Christian interlocutor asks whether the soul pre-exists, whether it exists 
after the individual’s life on earth, whether it descends repeatedly to life in the 
terrestrial cosmos and whether such returns are necessary or voluntary. Such 
questions allow examination of Neoplatonic problems, as will become apparent 
shortly. But they would also remind Christian readers of Origen’s doctrine of the 
                                                 
8  It may be that Aeneas both knows about philosophical ideas and is not very philosophically 
capable. Evaluating this question is beyond the scope of this paper. In brief, I have found few instances 
where Aeneas’ arguments might seriously bother a Neoplatonist. Certainly, Philoponus’ rebuttal of 
Proclus in the next generation shows greater philosophical acumen. 
9  Gallicet (1978) 141-3 (wrongly, I think) suggests Origenist tendencies in some of Aeneas’ views 
on creation. Wacht (1969) outlines Origen’s views on creation in the context of the Theophrastus (86-
90). For accounts of Origenism in this period, see Guillaumont (1962), Konstantinovsky (2009), Clark 
(1992). For Origen’s own ideas, see Edwards (2002), Williams (2004). 
10  For the monasteries around Gaza, see Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky (2000, 2004, 2006). Watts 
(2007) has outlined exchanges between monks and schoolmen around Gaza. 
11  See further Hombergen (2001).  
12  On infinity arguments in late antique philosophy, see Sorabji (2004) vol 2, 175-95; Sorabji (1983) 
Chapter 15. 
13  E.g. Porphyry, Against Boethus (Smith). Karamanolis (2007) 91-109 analyses Porphyry’s use of 
the concept of ἐμψυχία to rebut peripatetic arguments. 
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necessarily repeated return of souls to life on earth for their continuing ethical 
purification: rejection of Neoplatonic transmigration of souls could also be read as 
rejection of the Origenists’ theory of multiple resurrections. 
 I return shortly to such Origenist controversies. First, I investigate the Neoplatonic 
arguments which Aeneas more obviously uses his dialogue to explore. He begins with 
the following question: how does a soul come to inhabit a body? Following Plotinus, 
he reports Heraclitus’ views before moving to Empedocles, Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle. As in Plotinus and the later Neoplatonists, the Presocratic philosophers are 
passed over quickly. Aristotle’s concept of the soul as the activating power of the 
body is appended briefly to Plotinus’ doxography, and only ridiculed in what 
follows.14 As in Plotinus, Plato takes centre stage. Theophrastus repeats the view, 
found in Plotinus and repeated in the later Neoplatonists, that Plato makes his 
arguments suitable for their immediate dialectical context: dialogue is read as 
dialogue to avoid attributing confusion to Plato where he seems to say different things 
in different places (Plotinus, Enn. IV.8.23-9; Theophrastus 6.3-6).15 Aeneas thus 
displays knowledge of standard Neoplatonic exegetical principles, although he will 
soon use the diversity of opinion to cast doubt on Plato’s reliability as a source of 
knowledge, so his sympathies lie elsewhere. 
 The chief Platonic arguments for why the soul descends into bodies are all found 
in Plotinus’ doxography, although the arguments from the Phaedo are explicitly 
identified by Aeneas, where in Plotinus the reader is left to infer their providence. 
From the Phaedo, Theophrastus reports Socrates’ view that the earth and body are 
imperfect, and that therefore the body is a sort of prison for the soul (Plotinus Enn. 
IV.8.1.33, cf IV.8.3.1-7; Theophrastus 6.5-9). This view is extended in the Republic, 
where, in Theophrastus’ view, the release of the soul from the body is analogous to 
escape from the cave (Plotinus Enn. IV.8.1.35-7; Theophrastus 6.10-12). 
Theophrastus then moves to the Phaedrus, with a reference to the famous image of 
the winged souls borne down by force by the horse of evil (Plotinus Enn. IV.8.1.38-
40; Theophrastus 6.12-19). He concludes with reference to the Timaeus, in which 
Plato offers a more positive evaluation of the cosmos, calling it a blessed god, and 
arguing that the soul is made part of the cosmos to ensure that it is intelligent. In 
Platonic terms reported by Plotinus and Theophrastus, the cosmos is necessarily 
possessed of intellect, which would be impossible if it did not have a soul. The soul of 
each entity is its connection to the intelligible world. It makes the created order 
perfect. Souls therefore willingly enter the physical world in accordance with the plan 
of the demiurge for the perfection of the cosmos (Plotinus Enn. IV.8.1.42-51; 
Theophrastus 7.2-10).16
 The Christian character Euxitheus emphasises four of these opinions 
(Theophrastus 8.3-6). He identifies the options that the soul may return to an 
imperfect cosmos as a punishment, of necessity or by force (Phaedo, Republic, 
Phaedrus). By contrast, the Timaeus account has the rational soul returning both 
willingly and for the perfection of a good cosmos. All four options will be rejected on 
Christian grounds later on. At this point, the possibility of a pre-existent soul 
                                                 
14  Cf Eusebius PE XV. 
15  This approach is taken up explicitly in the extant Neoplatonic commentaries on the Phaedo, which 
reject on these grounds Iamblichus’ view that the five arguments given by Plato in the Phaedo for the 
soul’s immortality are each intended to prove the immortality of the soul.  
16  The Platonic foundations for these views may be found at Phaed. 62B, 67D, Crat. 400C; Rep. 
514A-517B, 619D; Phaedr. 246C-249A; Tim. 34B. 
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descending into bodies is provisionally accepted, and the argument turns to the mode 
of transmigration. 
 Theophrastus begins by setting out the so-called ‘Egyptian’ belief, picked up by 
Pythagoreans, that the human soul may return in a beast (Theophrastus 10.6-13). This 
belief finds support in Plato (Timaeus 91d-92b; cf Republic 620a).17 Plotinus seems to 
have understood the account literally; Aeneas’ report is accurate. Greedy men return 
as raptors, robbers as wolves, and the incontinent and intemperate as donkeys. For 
Theophrastus, references to Greek mythology also support the possibility of such 
metamorphoses. When we hear of Thersites being transformed into a monkey, ironic 
humour and ridicule of this position is surely not too far from the surface. Egyptus, a 
largely taciturn character in the dialogue who always supports the Christian 
Euxitheus, ridicules the whole idea as ‘a lot of strange talk’ (Φεῦ τῆς τερατολογίας) 
and Euxitheus himself calls it a ‘great joke’ (Theophrastus 10.15, 11.21). 
Theophrastus seems to persist with the idea only for the sake of completeness. He 
acknowledges its inadequacies and reports that Porphyry and Iamblichus rejected it by 
arguing for human-human transmigration because:  
the substance of the rational soul is one kind and that of the irrational soul is another, and [they 
argued] that they cannot be interchanged, but rather that the substances always remain self-
identical, in the same kind as they originally proceeded, since rationality is not an accidental 
quality of the soul…it is completely impossible that rationality be transformed into irrationality. 
(Theophrastus 12.15-7, 18-19)18
This matches the report of Iamblichus’ views in the scholium on Nemesius of 
Emesa’s De natura hominis.19 It is also consistent with Augustine’s account of 
Porphyry’s views (City of God 10.30).20 From these witnesses, we know that both 
Porphyry and Iamblichus argued that the nature of the soul does not change in 
transmigrations, but that the form of the body which it inhabits does. Aeneas’ 
example is taken from the stage. Actors do not change in nature when they play 
different characters (Theophrastus 12.23-5). The example from theatre is interesting 
in the context of Christian attacks on the mimes, which would be vigorously 
combated by Aeneas’ younger contemporary, the Christian orator and sophist 
Choricius.21 Such support for the theatre in Gaza parallels to some degree the 
sophists’ willingness to engage with Neoplatonism, even as they seek to replace its 
conclusions with Christian ideas. 
                                                 
17  See Rich (1957) 232-38. For a general overview of Plotinus on the soul, see Blumenthal (1996) 
82-104; Smith (2004) 40-73. 
18  ἄλλη μὲν λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἡ οὐσία, ἄλλη δ’ ἀλόγου καὶ ὅτι οὐ μετανίστανται, ἀλλ’ ὡσαύτως 
ἔχουσιν αἱ οὐσίαι, οἷαι τὸ πρῶτον προῆλθον· οὐ γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τῇ ψυχῇ συμβεβηκὸς … καὶ ὅλως 
ἀδύνατον τὸν λόγον εἰς ἀλογίαν μετατίθεσθαι. Support for human-human transmigration is found in 
Pl. Phaedr. 248d-e, Meno 82b-d, Phaed. 72e-73b. The same position is found in Hierocles On 
Providence 214.6, 172b (Schibli 334) cf. 251.4, 461b1-5 (Schibli 338-39). 
19  B. Einarson, Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis sec. 2, lines 595-600: Ἰάμβλιχος δὲ … κατ’  
εἶδος ζῴων ψυκῆς εἶδος εἶναι λέγει, ἤγουν εἴδη διάφορα. γέγραπται γοῦν αὐτῷ μονόβιβλον 
ἐπίγραφον ὅτι οὐκ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ζῷα ἄλογα οὐδὲ ἀπὸ ζῴων ἀλόγων εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἱ 
μετενσωματώσεις γίγνονται, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ζῴων εἰς ζῷα καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀνθρώπους.  
20  Fr. 300a (Smith). While Fr. 268 is ambiguous, it seems to mean that reincarnated souls of people 
who have been bestial will not live as beasts, but rather live beastly lives in human flesh. 
21  Choricius, Speech on behalf of the mimes, Oration 8 (Foerster-Richsteig 344-80). Procopius, 
Choricius’ teacher, linked pantomimes to effeminacy and civic violence, so a positive evaluation of the 
theatre was not uniform among Gazan sophists. Aeneas’ Ep. 7 (Positano 42-3) is ambiguous in its 
attitude to comedy. See Procopius, Panegyric to Anastasius 16 (Matino ed., 2005). On the general 
question of the mimes in Gaza, see Webb (2008) 147 and Chapter 9.  
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 Yet Iamblichus’ version of transmigration also receives short shrift from the 
Christian interlocutor (Theophrastus, 13.1-20). Making an intemperate soul return as 
an asinine man would only give it greater opportunity for intemperance, and so would 
not be a punishment at all. Informing this rebuttal is the Christian view that rationality 
is insufficient for virtue: a person may in fact enjoy his vicious actions, despite being 
rational. Further, such reincarnation would also be incompatible with a justly ordered 
cosmos. The demiurge would be like a judge who sentenced a robber to steal from a 
temple, ‘so that he might display his greediness without restraint’.22 Porphyry’s and 
Iamblichus’ account would therefore take away our responsibility for our own evil 
actions.  
 Theophrastus does not try to come to their aid. Instead, he outlines the views of 
Proclus and Syrianus, thus bringing his dialogue up to date with the most recent 
opinions within contemporary Neoplatonism (Theophrastus 14.7-17). According to 
Aeneas, Syrianus and Proclus reject both the idea that the rational soul can migrate 
into an irrational creature and that it would migrate into a physical form more suitable 
for it in its particular degeneracy. Instead, they suggest that the punishment is for the 
rational soul to be attached to the irrational soul of a beast. Thus a greedy man’s soul 
returns condemned to be bound to the soul of a raptor, rather than itself becoming the 
raptor’s soul. Humour is again Euxitheus’ response to this refinement. ‘Hector will be 
bound to a wasp, since both are chieftains and most war-like and Cleon will be a frog, 
for they both cry aloud often’ (Theophrastus 14.21-23).23 The ridicule becomes more 
pointed and explicit as Aeneas reports the views of the more recent philosophers, 
which may be a marker of the strength of his antipathy towards contemporary, rather 
than historic, Neoplatonism. An only slightly more serious objection again goes to the 
potential of such a scheme to overturn established morality. Sacrifice, a cornerstone of 
pagan morality tied to virtuous civic obligation, will instead be a means of release for 
bad souls which have been bound to beasts (Theophrastus 15.18-24). 
 So far, the Christian character has granted the possibility of pre-existence for the 
sake of the argument, then cast doubt on all the different possible accounts of pre-
existence on the basis of their conflict with traditional morality. This strategy is again 
employed when the possibility of pre-existence itself is questioned. The Neoplatonic 
commentary tradition took the argument that learning is recollection as proof of the 
pre-existence of the soul. Aeneas focuses his rebuttal of pre-existence on this 
argument (Olympiodorus, in Phaed 11-12, Damascius I, 253-310; Damascius II, 4-
28). His rebuttal again seeks to show the bad consequences for morality, providence 
and personal responsibility if recollection is accepted as a proof of the pre-existence 
of the soul. He grants that a pre-existent soul might remember the good, but he 
wonders why it would not also remember evils of earlier terrestrial lives (he ridicules 
Pythagoras’ reported belief that he remembered his earlier lives, claiming that such 
stories are like the babbling of an old woman) (Theophrastus 19.8-9). Yet if souls 
cannot remember the sufferings of their earlier existences (as Plato and Socrates 
suggest), then there can be no providential purpose in suffering (Theophrastus 17.1-
14). This would undermine divine providence, which works in part by punishing 
humans with evils in order to correct their errors. Furthermore, the idea that the 
descent of the soul is a punishment would lead to valid accusations of unfairness 
                                                 
22  This is a traditional Christian argument against transmigration, ironically (in the light of later 
condemnation of Origenists) to be found in Origen himself. See his Commentary on Romans 7.8, vol. 
2, (Bammel 502-3). See also the discussion at Edwards (2002) 97-98. 
23 σφηκὶ δὲ ὁ Ἕκτωρ συνδέδεται, κορυθαιόλω γὰρ ἄμφω καὶ μαχιμωτάτω, ὁ δὲ δὴ βάτραχος καὶ 
Κλέων ἦν, θαμὰ γὰρ βοῶσιν ἀμφότεροι. 
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against Providence. For if you cannot remember the sins you have committed, you 
have no way of knowing what they were and hence cannot understand the justice of 
your situation or learn from previous mistakes: ‘Readily and justly one despises the 
judge if, despite knowing no crime in oneself, one undergoes punishment’ 
(Theophrastus 17.13-14).24 Presumably a Neoplatonist would respond that you could 
infer your earlier actions from your current situation, at least to a high degree of 
probability. But Aeneas pushes the critique one stage further. Memory, which is 
essential to the formation of a coherent self, would be erased by reincarnation. A 
reincarnated being would ‘forget [his] very self’, and would not be able to remember 
his proper characteristics (Theophrastus 17.14-24).  
 Theophrastus has no reply to this argument that reincarnation is incompatible with 
a coherent account of the self. Aeneas does not seem aware of (or does not think 
relevant to his claims about memory) Plotinus’ extended argument about a soul 
having knowledge of its fixed identity in the world of the forms (Plotinus, Enn. 
IV.7).25 Instead, he makes the pagan character attempt to rebut Euxitheus’ claim that 
pre-existence of the soul is incompatible with conventional morality. The details of 
Theophrastus’ rebuttal are beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, I 
want to draw attention to the speed with which arguments about psychology and 
ontology move to ethics. Both interlocutors aim to rebut each other’s arguments about 
the nature of the soul by attempting to show that their views are immoral. If Aeneas’ 
main purpose in the sections of the dialogue which relate to the eternity of the world 
is to show that only the Christian concept of a finite cosmos is compatible with the 
claim that God is good, the same move is made repeatedly in his arguments about the 
soul. Attempting to provide a coherent account of the problem of human evil is one 
factor which links him to contemporary Neoplatonism. A common concern to explain 
and understand evil emerges from the debate and may be taken as one defining 
characteristic of late-antique (Christian and non-Christian) thought.  
 Given Aeneas’ accurate reporting of Platonic and Neoplatonic positions up to 
Proclus, the fact that he does not engage in rigorous argument, instead often having 
recourse to irony and sarcasm, suggests not so much ignorance of Neoplatonism as a 
different set of aims. One possible intra-Christian focus is counteracting re-emerging 
Origenist views about the soul. Origenist ideas became popular enough to warrant 
official condemnation in the middle of the sixth century. In the first quarter of the 
sixth century, letters between a monk and his spiritual advisor witness to the 
circulation of Origenist ideas in the Gazan monasteries (John and Barsanuphius, 
Letters 600-607). A large minority of monks at Gaza were drawn from the same 
social class as members of the rhetorical schools, and we can trace a number of key 
figures in the monasteries who had received classical rhetorical education in Gaza and 
Alexandria alongside Aeneas and his contemporaries.26 There is evidence that a 
monastic library was one of the communal buildings of at least one Gazan 
                                                 
24  ῥᾳδίως τε καὶ δικαίως κακίζει τὸν δικαστὴν ἐκεῖνος, εἰ φαῦλον μηδὲν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ συνειδὼς 
ὑπομένει τὴν τιμωρίαν. 
25  Porphyry argues that the soul gains self knowledge in its return to the intelligible world, where it 
can contemplate the intellect which eternally abides there as its changeless paradigm (fr. 275.20 
Smith). See further Blumenthal (1996) and Edwards (2002) 117 nn. 57-58. 
26  For example, Hilarion, his disciples Hesychas and Epiphanius, and a key figure in the next 
generation, Sivanus, all studied in Alexandria. For Silvanus, see Sozomen, Hist. eccl. VI,32. For further 
Alexandrian connections, including those of John Rufus, Severus, Peter the Iberian and Abba Isaiah, 
see Zacharias, Life of Severus and Life of Isaiah and John Rufus’ Life of Peter. For further discussion, 
see Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky (2000), 26, 28-29, 43ff.  
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monastery.27 There were many interactions between monks and townsfolk, and 
monks could travel between the monastery and the city.28 So it is plausible that 
Aeneas’ dialogue would have interested Gazan monks, and that the monasteries were, 
in Aeneas’ time, a locus for re-emerging Origenist ideas. This supposition may be 
strengthened by the fact that the Gazan monasteries were in part founded by monks 
from Alexandria who had been exiled for their Origenist beliefs in the late fourth 
century.29
 ‘Origenism’ was a motley collection of doctrines by the sixth century. It is 
difficult to reach beyond the official condemnations of the doctrines to beliefs held by 
Origenists themselves and often futile to try to tie their beliefs precisely to those of 
Origen himself. However, later sections of Aeneas’ dialogue seem partly directed at 
Origenist cosmology, particularly the doctrine that there is a rational, incorporeal and 
immaterial creation unified with Christ the Logos, and Aeneas also rejects the view 
that intelligible beings are infinite in number (Theophrastus 37-42). The final section 
of the dialogue emphasizes the reality of individual, unique and recognizable bodily 
resurrection, a criticism plausibly directed against Origenists who were condemned 
for believing that the perfect resurrection body was a spherical incorporeal entity, but 
which is a debate entirely foreign to Neoplatonism (Theophrastus 51ff).30. Each of 
these views would later be anathematised by the second council of Constantinople in 
553 (ACO 4.1, 248-9). 
 The first article of those anathemas is most pertinent for our immediate purposes: 
‘If anyone maintains the fabled pre-existence of souls and the monstrous restoration 
which follows from it: let him be anathema’ (Εἴ τις τὴν μυθώδη προΰπαρξιν τῶν 
ψυχῶν καὶ τὴν ταύτηι ἑπομένην τερατώδη ἀποκατάστασιν πρεσβεύει, ἀνάθεμα 
ἔστω) (ACO 4.1, 248,3-4).31 Aeneas’ arguments against pre-existence and 
transmigration, although more directly aimed at Neoplatonists, would also resonate in 
this intra-Christian context. Justinian’s imperial edict against Origenists has slightly 
different wording, but again picks out elements rejected by Aeneas. Justinian 
condemns anyone who ‘says or holds that the souls of men pre-existed’ (λέγει ἢ ἔχει 
προυπάρχειν τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχὰς) and goes on to argue that the descent of the 
soul into bodies is not a punishment (Justinian, Edict contra Origen, Anathema 1). 
Aeneas also explicitly rejects the idea that the descent of the soul into bodies is a 
punishment of pre-existent but fallen souls, arguing instead that God individually 
implants a soul into every human as the divine mark of rationality (Theophrastus 
38.4-7). 
                                                 
27  See Hevelone-Harper (2005) 24-25. Perrone (2004) 133 characterises the Thawatha monastery 
near Gaza as a ‘school’. 
28  For such interactions, see e.g. Barsanuphius and John, Epp 620-25, 667-73, 681-82, 712-18, 727-
29, 736-42, 749-56, 764-74). See further Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky (2006) Chapter 10, especially 
200-12. 
29  See further Rubenson (1995) and (1999). 
30  Compare Aujoulat (1987) 81: ‘la résurrection des corps et la mutation du monde mortel en un 
cosmos immortel constituent autant de problèmes inconnus à Hiérocleès, mais bien présents dans le 
Théophraste’. 
31  ἀποκατάστασις may pick out, somewhat confusedly, the Stoic doctrine of repeated creations and 
conflagrations, attributing something like it to the Origenists. More likely, it identifies the Origenist 
ideas that souls are repeatedly resurrected, if they have been virtuous, to successively higher orders of 
existence. If so, Aeneas’ rejection of the views of ‘those from the Stoa’ on this point may also resonate 
with critics of Origenism (Theophrastus 51.18-23). Aeneas repetedly emphasises that there is only one 
act of creation, and that creation will be brought to a single, perfect end. 
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 One of the reasons Origen himself seems to have posited multiple resurrections to 
successively higher planes of being was to explain how the physical body could be 
purified, in successive stages, to attain divine perfection.32 Aeneas also believes that 
the created order is a training ground for mortals (e.g. Theophrastus 35.15-36.3). But 
he repeatedly makes the case that a single life is sufficient for being trained up to 
heaven. Repeated resurrections are not necessary since ‘the present life is sufficient 
for our illumination’ (Theophrastus 35.17).33 He argues that the creation provides 
sufficient signs of truthfulness and goodness in creation, and if necessary, the creator 
punishes people sufficiently once, rather than subjecting them to repeated 
punishments. Paradise is the reward for the just; unrepentant sinners are condemned 
to eternal punishments (Theophrastus 35.21-36.3). While these arguments may apply 
against a Neoplatonic opponent, who argues that a bad life can only be punished if 
there is punishment in the next descent of the soul, they also strike more deeply 
against the Origenist scheme, where souls are trained to be suitable for successively 
higher modes of existence. Such successive refinement, Aeneas implies, is 
unnecessary, and calls into question the efficacy of divine providence, for if God 
cannot perfect his creatures once and for all, his salvific power appears limited. 
 Of course, the main threat in the schools remained the Platonists. In setting 
Christian ideas against pagan ones, Aeneas needed all the help he could marshal. The 
need to create alliances with the nearby Christian communities against this immediate 
social, intellectual and religious problem may be part of the reason why Aeneas did 
not attack Origenism directly. His oblique approach may also be explained by the 
relative weakness of Origenist ideas around 485: it would be another six decades 
before Origenism was formally condemned. Another possible reason for the oblique 
approach may be friendships formed with the monks over Monophysite disputes.34 
Yet Aeneas’ rejection of the pagan idea of the pre-existence and repeated return of the 
soul, alongside his emphasis on bodily resurrection, can also be read as a rejection of 
Origenism. If this reading is accepted, the dialogue implicitly attacks Origenists by 
identifying them with pagans. 
 The extended collection of philosophical opinions on the soul in the Theophrastus 
demonstrates that Aeneas possessed direct knowledge of contemporary Neoplatonism. 
He follows the standard methods of contemporary Neoplatonic commentators and sets 
his own ideas against the background of the golden chain of Platonism accepted by 
his philosophical contemporaries, whose views he reports accurately. Yet his main 
concern is to provide a coherent Christian account rather than to correct and improve 
Neoplatonism. His arguments against the Neoplatonists rarely strike home; mockery, 
humour, irony and sarcasm often pass for argument. He nevertheless finds 
Neoplatonic conceptual schemes and philosophical methods useful for Christianity. I 
have suggested that one way in which Neoplatonism is useful is in his attempt to 
rebut, albeit obliquely, Origenist ideas. That Aeneas turns to a Neoplatonic conceptual 
scheme partly in order to clarify intra-Christian arguments witnesses both to Aeneas’ 
openness towards Neoplatonic philosophy and to the social and intellectual power 
Neoplatonism still exerted in the rhetorical schools of late-antique Gaza. The implicit 
rebuttal of Origenist ideas about the soul suggests proximate intellectual communities 
in which Origenism could gain support. Aeneas’ dialogue is circumstantial evidence 
that this interest in Origenism should be traced to the Gazan monasteries in the last 
quarter of the fifth century.  
 
 
                                                 
32  See Williams (2004) 132-42. 
33  ἱκανὸς γὰρ ὁ παρὼν βίος πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν. 
34  While Aeneas’ dialogue does not display clear evidence of Monophysite tendencies, he was known 
to monks who were leading Monophysites. 
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